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Futuratc Meanings
Bridget Copley

1 Introduction
A futttrate is a reading of a sentence with no obvious means of future refer
ence, which nevertheless has a future-oriented eventuality. Futuratcs in ad
dition carry a flavor of a plan or schedule (in some sense to be made more

precise).1 The sentences in (1) and (2) are examples of futuratcs. The (a)
examples, which discuss a plannablc event (a baseball game), arc far more ac

ceptable than the (b) examples, which refer to a presumably unplannable event
(the Red Sox's winning).
{1)

(2)

a.

The Red Sox play the Yankees tomorrow,

b.

# The Red Sox defeat the Yankees tomorrow.

a.

The Red Sox arc playing the Yankees tomorrow,

b.

# The Red Sox arc defeating the Yankees tomorrow.

The (a) examples convey, roughly, that there exists a plan for the Red Sox and
the Yankees to play tomorrow; the (b) examples, however, are decidedly odd.

By comparison, there is nothing odd about (3):2
(3)

The Red Sox will defeat the Yankees tomorrow.

The oddness of (lb) and (2b), as compared to (3), seems to stem from the fact
that the winner of a baseball game is (usually) not decided ahead of time. The
sentences in (lb) and (2b) improve markedly in a context where it is presup
posed that the winner can be decided ahead of time, for instance, if we are
allowed to consider the possibility that someone has fixed the game.

As can be seen in (1) and (2), in English both simple and progressive
forms can have futurale construals. While there are differences between the
meanings of these forms, they share a great deal. In this paper I will con
centrate on the meaning of progressive futurates; see Copley (2002) for an
analysis of the differences between simple and progressive futuratcs.

'Early work on futurates includes Prince (1971); Lakoff (1971); Vctter (1973); Huddleston (1977), and Dowty (1979). See Binnick (1991) for an overview. More recent
efforts are in Landman (1992), Portncr (1998), Cipria and Roberts (2000), and Copley
(2002).

2Yankees fans often report that (3) does seem a little odd to them, but the facts
(www.mlb.com) suggest that this is just wishful thinking.
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2 An Initial Hypothesis and its Problems
Consider again ihe futuratc contrast in (2), repeated below as (4).
(4)

a.

The Red Sox are playing the Yankees tomorrow,

b.

# The Red Sox are defeating the Yankees tomorrow.

As noted above, the sentence in (4a) seems to say that there is a plan for the
Red Sox lo play the Yankees tomorrow. But is this plan "just" somehow part of

the pragmatics, or can a case be made for putting some formal representation
of the plan in the semantics of (4a,b)?
It seems that the existence of a plan in fuluratcs matters, at the very least,
to temporal predicates; the time over which the plan is asserted to hold is
constrained by tense and can also be constrained by a temporal adverbial. The
utterance in (5) seems to convey that at some time in the past, for a period of
two weeks, there was a plan for the Red Sox to play the Yankees today.
(5)

For two weeks, the Red Sox were playing the Yankees today.

The semantics of futurates will thus need to refer to al least the duration of
the aforementioned plan. But what is the nature of the reference to the plan?
Let us suppose, as an initial hypothesis, that a plan, as far as the grammar

is concerned, is simply the conjunction of future-oriented propositions. For
now, I will not venture to say what might make any old conjunction of futureoriented propositions a plan. Al least the propositions ought to be consistent

with each other, for example. But let us suppose, for now, that whatever else
makes a plan a plan, it is not manipulated by the semantics, but only lives in
the pragmatics. This supposition will, incidentally, turn out to be incorrect
If propositions arc sets of worlds, we can define a plan as the joint inter
section of a set of type (w,t) propositions p, where each of these propositions
is equal to a type (i,{wt)) proposition q applied to a future time.
(6)

Definition of planhood (initial try):
Xwt is a plan in w al I if

Xwt = n{p: p € D(wl) & 3q <= D^wt)): [3t' > l: [p = q(t')]]}
A plan then provides for p just in case all worlds in the plan arc also in p.

(7)

Vp € D/Wt). Xwt provides for p iff Vw' such that w' e X^: (p(w')]

We ihcn define a futuratc operator OP, as in (8) below, that takes a proposition,
a world, and a time, and asserts that al that world and lime there is a plan that
provides for p.

FUTURATE MEANINGS
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Op = Ap Aw At. 3Xwt: Xwt provides lor p

This, then, is our initial hypothesis for the meaning of futurates. Of course it is
not this easy; there turn out to be a number of problems with this hypothesis.
2.1 Problem #1: The Status of the Plan

The first problem is that futurates do not really seem to assert the existence of
a plan that provides for p; for if they did, we would expect (9a) to mean that
there does not exist a plan for the Red Sox to play the Yankees tomorrow. But

this meaning is not quite right. Suppose that Major League Baseball has not

yet decided who plays whom tomorrow. Then clearly, neither (9a) nor (9b) is

felicitous.3
(9)

a.

The Red Sox aren't playing the Yankees tomorrow,

b. The Red Sox are playing the Yankees tomorrow.

So futurates apparently exclude the middle: in the case where there is no par

ticular plan with anything to say about the Red Sox playing the Yankees, nei
ther (9a) nor (9b) are felicitous. This is in conflict with the proposed meaning
for futurates, in which the negation ("There does not exist a plan for the Red

Sox to play the Yankees tomorrow') is felicitous in exactly this middle case.4

One possible solution to the problem in (9) would be to interpret negation
below the futuratc operator Op. Then (9a) would be predicted to mean some
thing like "The Red Sox are planned to not play the Yankees tomorrow.' But

while this solution works for (9a), it is unavailable for biclausal cases such as
(10), which exhibit exactly the same problem.
(10)

I doubt that the Red Sox play the Yankees tomorrow.

What (10) seems to mean is that the speaker doubts that the plan provides
for the Red Sox playing the Yankees tomorrow. That is, the speaker is of
the opinion that the plan provides for the Red Sox to not play the Yankees

3Whether this judgment actually is one of felicity conditions or truth value is an
open question. I will assume that futurates do not get truth values until the eventuality
in question either comes about or fails to come about. However, the judgments seem

to have the robustness of truth value judgments, and indeed, elsewhere (Copley, 2002)

I have treated them thus. Since Aristotle's Physics this issue has been central to the
discussion of future contingents; 1 will not attempt to treat it at length here.

4For more on the Law of the Excluded Middle, see van Fraasscn (1966) and Thomason(!970).
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tomorrow. So again, the middle is excluded, but the option of interpreting the
embedded-clause futurate operator over the matrix clause doubt is unavailable.
So p is either entailed by the plan, or inconsistent with the plan, but it
cannot be merely consistent with it. What this fact suggests is a presupposition
that the plan provides either for p or for not-p; that is, that a p-eventuality is
the sort of thing that is either planned to happen or planned to not happen.
This idea explains the judgments in (11) in terms of a presupposition failure (a
failure that is ameliorated if we suppose that the eventualities in question are,
in fact, part of someone's plan).
(11)

a.
b.

#The Red Sox are defeating the Yankees tomorrow.
#It's raining tomorrow.

It is not yet clear where this presupposition would fit in compositionally. I
will raise this question again below, as the solution to the second problem will
prove relevant.
2.2 Problem #2: Speaker Confidence
The second problem with the initial hypothesis is that futurates commit the
speaker to the belief that the eventuality in question will in fact occur, as shown
in (12a). 5 This would be surprising under our initial hypothesis, as there is no
problem with asserting, as in (12b), that there is a plan that provides for p but
you don't think it will happen.
(12)

a.
b.

#The Red Sox play the Yankees tomorrow, but they won't/might
not.
There is a plan for the Red Sox to play the Yankees tomorrow,
but they won't/might not.

If the assertion of the futurate in (12a) really is just that the plan exists, it is

not clear why spelling it out that there is a plan, as in (12b), should be any
different. Yet the futurate shows a conflict with denying that the eventuality
will happen, while the explicit assertion that there is a plan does not. Our
initial hypothesis cannot account for this difference.
Could this problem be solved by adding as part of the assertion contributed by the future operator, an assertion reflecting speaker confidence that
the plan will be realized? (This wouldn't mean that the plan would actually
have to be realized, merely that the speaker would be asserting that it would
5

This fact seems not to have been discussed in the literature prior to Copley (2002),
and indeed I know of no other analyses that can account for it.
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be.) It turns out that this move will not work. In past tense futurates. the real
ization of the plan doesn't seem to be part of the assertion, as shown below in

(13). Past tense futurates do not commit the speaker to the belief that the plan

was or will be realized.6
(13)

The Red Sox were playing the Yankees tomorrow, but now they won't.

So assertion of the realization of the plan is apparently not an option for ex
plaining the contrast in (12).

3 Getting Smarter about Plans
What went wrong with the proposed meaning for futurates? Consider the
problematic examples again.

(14)

a.

#1 doubt that the Red Sox are playing the Yankees tomorrow.

b.

# The Red Sox are playing the Yankees tomorrow but they might
not.

The first problem is that (14a) appears to have a presupposition that the even
tuality be of a kind that could, in principle, be planned. The second problem,
the unacceptability of (14b), seems to indicate that the speaker of a futurale
has some high level of confidence that the future eventuality will happen.
In order to solve these problems, we will need to know something more
about plans than that merely they are sets of future-oriented propositions. This
is clearest in the case of the first problem; we apparently need to care whether
or not a p-eventuality is something that could be planned. Some eventual

ities can be planned, it seems, and some can't, and this is relevant.

Since

any future-oriented proposition trivially could be included in a set of futureoriented propositions, we must have a more restrictive definition of what it is
to be a plan.

In the second problem, too, this issue arises. Above I have argued that

the speaker confidence cannot be part of the assertion of a futurate. Suppose
instead that the confidence is a presupposition, that the speaker of a futurate
presupposes that the eventuality will actually happen. But this too docs not

6Hcre is one case where progressive and simple futurates differ; simple futuraics
arc extremely marked, if not impossible, in the past tense:
i. #Thc Red Sox played the Yankees tomorrow.

These past simple futurates do improve under sequence of tense and in narrative con
texts, but the contrast is very striking.
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seem right, as Vetter (1973) argues. If there were such a presupposition, the
sentence in (14b) would deny its own presupposition, because the presuppo

sition of the embedded clause would also be a presupposition of the matrix.
Consider (15), for example:

(15)

I doubt that John has quit smoking.

The matrix clause, like the embedded clause, presupposes that John smoked
at one time; this property is a general property of attitude sentences (Karttunen, 1974; Heim, 1992). Vcttcr argues that the same kind of presupposition

projection is at work in (10), repeated below as (16).
(16)

I doubt that the Red Sox arc playing the Yankees tomorrow.

Thus the sincere utterer of (16) would doubt whether the Red Sox would play,
but presuppose that the speaker was sure that they would play.

Likewise, a putative presupposition of speaker confidence would be to
tally inappropriate for futuratc questions, as in (17). We certainly would not
want the speaker of (17) to be presupposing that the Red Sox arc playing the
Yankees tomorrow.
(17)

Are the Red Sox playing the Yankees tomorrow?

Therefore, following Vcttcr, I conclude that a presupposition of speaker
confidence is not the correct presupposition for futurates.

The appropriate presupposition, rather, seems to be a conditional one: the
speaker is certain that //the plan says the Red Sox play the Yankees tomorrow,
they will. This can be both a presupposition of the embedded clause and the
matrix clause without contradiction, and it would yield the correct judgments.

Furthermore, a conditional presupposition of this sort would also solve the
first problem. Recall that there seemed to be a presupposition that either p is
planned or not-p is planned. This presupposition would be subsumed under a
conditional presupposition. So a conditional presupposition seems correct.
(18)

Conditional presupposition: If p is planned, p will happen.

But if that is so, again we must specify more about the plan than we have so

far been willing to do. If a plan is just a set of future-oriented propositions,
then futurates should be able to vary as to whether their plans consist only of
propositions describing eventualities that will actually turn out to happen, or
only of those that will not turn out to happen, or a combination of both. Thus
there should be no conditional presupposition, and no excluded middle. But

FUTURATE MEANINGS
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this conclusion contradicts the observed facts. Therefore, once again, we need
a more restrictive definition of a plan than merely an arbitrary set of futureoriented propositions.

So how does this conditional presupposition of futurates arise from more
plausibly primitive semantic objects? Let's consider our intuitions about plans.

4 Intuitions about Plans
If we consider what we know about plans aside from their being sets of future-

oriented propositions, we might come up with the following three initial intu
itions:
1. A certain entity has a desire for the plan to be realized.

2. The entity has the ability to see that the plan is realized.
3. Plans can change, since desires and abilities can change.
I take these intuitions, without argument, to be a reasonably good starting
point.

Unpacking them will motivate our theory of plans in more familiar

semantic terms.

4.1 On Being Committed

The first intuition on the list is that the person making the plan for p must

somehow want p to happen. However, an entity can have a plan and intend to
carry it out, seemingly without actually wanting to, as in (19).

(19)

I'm doing laundry tomorrow, even though I don't want to.

Is there a problem, then, with the naive intuition?
I think we can safely say that there is no substantive problem here, on the
strength of Kratzer's discussion of a parallel issue (Kratzer, 1991). Here is a
version of Kratzer's point. Suppose that I only have enough clean clothes to
make it through tomorrow. Suppose also that the propositions in (20) are true.
(20)

a.

I want to have clean clothes.

b. I don't want (= want not) to do my laundry.

c. I don't want to (= want to not) have someone else do my laundry.
d.

I don't want to (= want to not) buy new clothes.

Assuming that the only ways I am going to get clean clothing are by washing
my clothes myself, having someone else do it for me, or buying something new
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to wear, then there is no world in which all of the desires expressed in (20) are

true because taken together they are contradictory. And yet the desires in (20)
are perfectly natural simultaneous desires.

The introduction of gradable modality into the modal framework allows

us to model contradictory desires such as those in (20). The idea is that my
desires in (20) — and desires in general — do not all have equal weight. In

the present instance, suppose that above all else I would like to avoid buying
new clothes. Next most important to me is to avoid having someone else do

my laundry. Having clean clothes is my next priority, and avoiding doing the
laundry myself is least important. In such a scenario, it is obvious that my best

course of action is to resign myself to doing my laundry. Thus the utterance in
(21) expresses a true proposition.
(21)

I should do laundry tomorrow, even though I don't want to.

Now we alter the theory of modals to get (21) to turn out true. In Kratzer's

terminology, the conversational background consisting of the propositions ex
pressed in (20) provides an ordering source on the accessible worlds being

quantified over. The ordering source partitions the worlds into sets, and ranks
them according to how well they agree with the conversational background.
In our case, for instance, worlds in which I do my own laundry are the best

possible worlds; worlds in which I buy new clothes so I can have something
to wear tomorrow, are the worst.

The modal should is approximated by universal quantification over not
the set of accessible worlds, but the set of best accessible worlds. On all those
worlds, I do my laundry. Thus the reason that (21) comes out true is not that

my desires are not involved in the evaluation of the should clause, but that
should takes into account my "net" desires, while want does not.

This mechanism works equally well to explain why (19) is true, not con
tradictory. We might therefore revise the statement of the intuition to say that

the following is true of an entity making a plan for p: p is true in all the worlds
that are optimal according to an ordering source given by the entity's desires.

Let's call net desires commitments. Then a fact about an entity's plan for p is
that p is true on all the worlds consistent with the entity's commitments.
4.2 On Ability

The second intuition about plans was that the entity making the plan, if it is

a valid plan, has the ability to see that the plan is realized. To demonstrate
the role of this claim, suppose that my five-year-old cousin Max utters the
sentence in (22a) and his mother Chelsea says the one in (22b).

I-UTURATE MEANINGS

(22)

a.

We're seeing Spiderman tomorrow.

b.

We are not seeing Spiderman tomorrow.
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Max is clearly mistaken in uttering (22a). What is not clear from what I have

told you is which of two mistakes he is making. He could be making a mistake
about his mother's commitments, still accepting that she is the one with the
ability to determine which movie the family will see. In that case, he will
probably correct his belief upon hearing what his mother has to say on the
subject.

On the other hand, being a five-year-old, he could equally be under the
misapprehension that he has the authority to make plans for the family. On
thai scenario, he wants to see Spiderman (that is, he is committed to it), and
believes that he has the ability to make that happen, so that his mother's com
ment may well not change his belief.

But it is Chelsea and not Max, of course, who really has the ability to
say what the family does. For a certain class of eventualities, if she wants
an eventuality to happen, it happens.

And equally, if she doesn't want an

eventuality to happen, it doesn't happen. What Mom says, goes, or at least, is
presupposed to go.

43 On Changes

But plans do not always get realized. One way they might fail to be realized
is because the person doing the planning might change their mind. The other

way is because their abilities might change; i.e., the best laid schemes of mice
and men might go, as they so often do, awry. We may presuppose that Mom
has the ability to say what goes, but it can happen that somewhere along the

way, something unexpected, and more powerful, disrupts her plans. Chelsea
may, for example, utter the sentence in (23), but if there are flash floods and
they cannot get to the theater the next day, what she ordained did not happen.
(23)

We're seeing Scooby Doo tomorrow.

This kind of thing happens now and then.

It does not shake our belief in

Chelsea's authority as a mother if there happens to be a flash flood just as they
start out for the movie theatre. We still want to presuppose that what Mom

and Dad say about certain events, goes, all else being equal.7 This kind of
7What if Mom and Dad disagree? If they are really sharing control they probably
won't talk about the possible options using fuiuratcs. The reader can verify this by
trying some futurates on his or her significant other.
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ceteris paribus restriction on the possible worlds being considered is a familiar

one, seen throughout the modal literature (e.g., Stalnaker, 1968; Lewis, 1986;
Krat/cr, 1991). Dowty (1979) invokes it for progressives by delimiting a set of

"incrtial worlds," which is roughly the set of worlds on which things proceed
normally. This restriction also applies to commitments: we assume that they
will not change, even though we recognize that they could.

5 Proposal
Now we will incorporate the three intuitions discussed above into the seman

tics of futurates. Recall once more the examples that were problematic for our
initial hypothesis for futurate meaning:
(24)

a.

#1 doubt that the Red Sox are playing the Yankees tomorrow.

b.

# The Red Sox are playing the Yankees tomorrow but they might
not.

The initial semantics for the example in (24a) appeared to be lacking a presup
position to cause the observed presupposition failure, and the example in (24b)

was mysteriously contradictory. I attributed these problems to an inadequate
understanding of plans. I showed this in part by showing that the example in
(24a) indicated that something like the conditional in (25) was needed as a

presupposition, to account for the contradictory nature of (24a).
(25)

Conditional presupposition: If p is planned, p will happen.

(25), of course, could be stipulated, but we wanted to know whether it followed
from some more basic properties of plans.
The intuitions fleshed out above regarding the entities behind the plans
will now prove to be of use in augmenting our representation of plans to ac
count for (24a) and (24b). Before we start, let us agree to call the entity who
makes a plan a director. As we have seen, the director need not be the subject

of the sentence; for now, let's suppose that a director is supplied contextually.
Directors must be animate; they may also be plural individuals (e.g., Major
League Baseball and Max's parents both qualify as possible directors).
A director for a proposition p, according to the intuitions detailed above,
has at least two properties: the ability to ensure that p happens, and the com

mitment to seeing that it does happen. I would like to propose that, in futurates,
the former property is attributed to the director in a presupposition, and that the
latter property is attributed to the director in the assertion, as stated informally
in (26).

FUTURATE MEANINGS
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a.
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Presupposition: The director has the ability to ensure that p hap
pens

b.

Assertion: The director is committed to p happening

In effect, the presupposition in (26) is a restatement of what I called the con

ditional presupposition, given above in (25).

If it is presupposed that the

contexlually-supplied director has the ability to see that the eventuality is car
ried out, presupposition failure will rule out utterances such as The Red Sox
are defeating the Yankees tomorrow, cases where we assume there could not
be such a plan. This is as desired.

The second problem is also solved. The reason (24b) is a contradiction,
on this proposal, is that the second conjunct contradicts an cntailment of the
first conjunct. The utterer of The Red Sox are playing the Yankees tomorrow

presupposes that the plan for them to do so is made by someone who has the
ability to sec that such a plan is carried out (Major League Baseball, in this
case). Combined with the assertion that there is such a plan, it is entailed
that the plan will come to fruition. Thus it feels like a contradiction for the
speaker to continue on to assert that it might not. However, if past tense affects

the temporal location of both the director's commitments and the director's
abilities, we still correctly predict that it is not contradictory to say (27).
(27)

The Red Sox were playing the Yankees tomorrow, but then Major
League Baseball changed its mind.

This is because we are only making a statement about what an entity's com

mitments and abilities were at some time in the past. Since cither of these
could have changed since then, the speaker is not committed to the belief that
the eventuality did or will happen.
At this point, we have a hypothesis about both the assertion and presuppo
sition of futurates. To formalize it, let us define d directs p in watt to capture

the notion of the ability to make a valid plan, for use in presuppositions of
futurates. This ability is the ability to ensure that, if d is committed to p's
happening, d will happen. (Note that this formulation is quite similar to the
conditional presupposition above.) The antecedent includes all cases where p

is true on alt the worlds in which d's commitments are satisfied; we discussed
this earlier. The consequent, however, we have not discussed. How to express

what will actually turn out to happen is not clear. It could be a metaphysical
modal base with an empty ordering source, or a single future. We do not have

any way to decide between these alternatives here, so I will just use the former
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option. Here, then, is a formal definition of direction.8
(28)

An entity d directs a proposition p in w at t iff:
Vw', d has the same abilities in w' as in w:

[Vw" metaphysically accessible from w'at t and consistent
with d's commitments in w'at t:
[Vw'" metaphysically accessible from w at t:

[3t' > t: [p(w")(t')l <=> pt": > t: [p(w'" )(
What this definition docs is to take a set of worlds and say that there is
a subset of that set, such that all the worlds in the subset agree with all the

worlds in the larger set on a certain property.9 The larger set is the entire set of
metaphysically possible worlds, while the subset is the set of worlds consistent
with the director's commitments (but still metaphysically accessible).

The

property is the property of there being some future time at which p is true
on the world in question. Thus, whether the director's commitment-worlds
have the property determines whether the entire set of metaphysically possible

worlds has that property or not.10 That is, what the director says, goes (or at
least, is presupposed to go).

The presupposition of futuratcs is then simply the presupposition in (29):
(29)

Direction presupposition: d directs p in w at t

The assertion is, still, that the future-oriented proposition p is consistent
with d's commitments, i.e., maximally consistent with d's desires, in w at l.
(30)

Commitment assertion: d is committed to p in w at t

And the meaning we want for the futuratc operator is as follows.
(31)

OP(d)(p)(w)(t) is defined iff d directs p in w at t. If defined,
OP(d)(p)(w)(t) = 1 iff d is committed to p in w at t.

8For reasons of space, not lo mention complexity, I will noi further formalize the
notions of commitment and ability.

'The double restriction to metaphysically accessible worlds is not redundant. Sup
pose, for instance, that d wants p and also wants not-p, and only p is metaphysically
possible. If we were considering all of d's desire-worlds, d would not have an opinion
about p. But intuitively, d does have an opinion about p in such a case.

luIt is here mat the Law of the Excluded Middle is incorporated: The worlds must
all agree, whether on p or on not-p.
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6 Conclusions and Further Questions
In this paper, I have presented a denotation for a futuratc operator that solves
two problems of futurate meaning. The problems, I argued, indicated that we
needed more information about what constitutes a plan. Based on intuitions

about plans, I introduced the concept of director, the entity who is committed
to seeing the plan realized, and is able to make it come about. I argued that
futuratcs presuppose that an entity d directs a proposition p, and assert that d
is committed to p.

One consequence of this approach is that much of the meaning falls out
from our real-world intuitions about plans. Since these intuitions led us to a
modal semantics, complete with ordering sources and ceteris paribus condi
tions, an obvious further question is whether the modality in progressive futurates can be assimilated to the modality in progressives that are non-futurates.

Progressive achievements (Rothstein, 2000) further complicate the question;
they alone have future orientation in the absence of a flavor of planning, as the
contrast in (32) demonstrates.

(32)

a.
b.

The sun is rising soon,
# It is raining soon.

Should (32a) cause us to abandon the preceding discussion of plans in futu
ratcs? I think it should not. Instead it should make us wonder what the dif
ferences and similarities are between plans, which have to do with an animate

entity's force of will, and natural forces, which cause the sun to rise or rain to
fall. Since real-world considerations have already entered into the discussion,
perhaps a greater understanding of the facts about natural forces might help
provide an explanation for the contrast in (32).
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